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Imagine, if you can, watching your husband linger in pain for over
three months after suffering terrible bums from an explosion during combat
operations in Iraq. 1 Imagine your five-month-old daughter being held by
her father, just once before he finally slips away. 2 After carrying your hus-
band to his final rest in a small town, you eulogize him from a pulpit before
a packed room of not only friends and family, but also soldiers and sup-
porters. 3 You talk about the love you carry for your soul mate and the pride
you feel for your husband's service to his country.4
Then imagine that, in the face of your pain, you hear a crowd exclaim,
"Thank God for dead soldiers!" and you see a sign inscribed with that
phrase. 5
Mrs. Katie Youmans, widow of Army Sergeant Joshua Youmans,
experienced exactly that.6 Her husband's funeral was protested by the
Westboro Baptist Church,7 a group whose conduct U.S. Representative
Silvestre Reyes described as "so reprehensible that there are hundreds of
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, May 2009. The author wishes to thank Zach Christman
for all his support, as well as John Humphreys, Rachel Moran, Maribel Nash, and Assistant Dean
Stephen Sowle.
1. See Mich. Soldier Met Daughter Before He Died, BOSTON.COM, Mar. 6, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/03/06/mich-soldier mets-daughter-before-he-died/;
see also Fallen Heroes Memorial, Fallen Heroes of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
http://www.fallenheroesmemorial.com/oif/profiles/youmansjoshuav.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
2. See Legislative Hearing on H.R. 23, H.R. 601, H.R. 2188, H.R. 2963, H.R. 4843, H.R. 5037,
and H.R. 5038 Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the H. Comm. on
Veterans' Affairs, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers); Mich.
Soldier Met Daughter Before He Died, supra note 1. For an audio recording of the Legislative Hearing,
see Audio Recording: House Veterans' Affairs Committee Audio, Committee on Veterans' Affairs
(Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/schedule 109/apr06/4-6-06/4-6-06.wma.
3. See Hearing, supra note 2, at 5.
4. See id.
5. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (D. Md. 2008).
6. See Hearing, supra note 2, at 5; Mich. Soldier Met Daughter Before He Died, supra note 1.
7. See Hearing, supra note 2, at 5.
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thousands of Americans that are outraged."' 8
With stories such as Mrs. Youmans' recounted in Committee Hear-
ings, Congress passed the Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act
(RAFHA), and with President George W. Bush's signature, it became law
in May 2006. 9 The RAFHA prohibits picketing and protesting near funerals
at federal cemeteries.10
This note explores the constitutionality of the RAFHA. In particular,
this note provides an in-depth view of the history and purpose of funerals,
both psychologically and sociologically, which courts require to properly
assess the RAFHA, but which is lacking in current legal writing."1
The RAFHA should be held constitutional because it meets all rele-
vant requirements for speech regulation, as established by the Supreme
Court of the United States: (1) a content-neutral and (2) narrowly tailored
statute that achieves (3) a significant state interest, while (4) allowing am-
ple alternative means of idea expression. 12
Indeed, the RAFHA is content neutral and narrowly tailored to
achieve a significant state interest, while leaving open ample alternative
means of idea expression. 13 The RAFHA is content neutral because it pro-
scribes all demonstrations that interfere with the normal activities of funer-
als, instead of proscribing demonstrations containing only a specific
message. 14 The RAFHA is narrowly tailored because it restricts demonstra-
8. Id. at I 1 (statement of Rep. Silvestre Reyes, Member, H. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs).
9. See Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. No. 109-228, 120 Stat. 387 (codified at
38 U.S.C. § 2413, 18 U.S.C. § 1387 (2006)). To view a photograph of the signing ceremony, see Con-
gressman Mike Rogers, Representing Michigan's 8th District, http://www.mikerogers.house.gov/
Gallery.aspx?G=2 (last visited June 6, 2009). Although this note focuses on the activities of the West-
boro Baptist Church, the RAFHA applies generally to all protests and protest groups. See 38 U.S.C.
§§ 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii), (b); infra note 223.
10. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413.
11. See generally Andrea Cornwell, Comment, A Final Salute to Lost Soldiers: Preserving the
Freedom of Speech at Military Funerals, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1329 (2007) (discussing the absence of
social context); Megan Dunn, Note, The Right to Rest in Peace: Missouri Prohibits Protesting at Fu-
nerals, 71 Mo. L. REV. 1117 (2006) (same); infra Part Ill. But see Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to
Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD.
L. REV. 295, 306-09 (2008) (providing a brief overview of the psychological and sociological purposes
of funerals and discussing a "right to mourn"). Although courts have recognized cemeteries as "sacred,"
see, e.g., State v. Bradbury, 9 A.2d 657, 658-59 (Me. 1939), freedom of religion is outside the scope of
this note. For a brief discussion of religious issues in this context, see Rutledge, supra, at 309-10.
12. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (stating that a
state may enforce content-neutral regulations which are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication"); infra Part I; cf Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (noting that content-specific regulation requires "the most exacting
scrutiny").
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413; see also infra Part IV.B.
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tions near a federal cemetery for only a short time surrounding funeral ser-
vices--one hour before until one hour after a funeral. 15 Allowing grieving
families a peaceful, solemn and uninterrupted funeral, protecting normal
funeral operations, and maintaining societal norms, serve as a significant
state interest. 16 By regulating during only a small time period, rather than
regulating the content of the speech, the RAFHA leaves open ample alter-
native means of idea expression, enabling a protest group to continue to
express its ideas in other ways, such as via the Internet, or at government
buildings, military bases, and even music concerts. 17
Part I of this note details relevant court treatment of congressional
regulation of speech. 18 Aside from identifying the relevant Supreme Court
test for speech regulation, Part I notes not only that the First Amendment is
not an absolute, but also that courts consider context, history, and societal
norms in determining the constitutionality of speech regulation. 19
Part II examines court treatment of funerals and death-related issues.
For example, Part II discloses that courts have recognized the significance
of the emotional well-being of the bereaved and the deep roots of burial
rites. 20 Part II also reveals that courts have noted that the funeral serves a
healing function by creating a safe haven for the bereaved.
Part III explores the history and purpose of funerals, as well as the
critical role that the public plays in facilitating healing of sorrow by provid-
ing expressions of support and social understanding to the mourner. Aside
from facilitating healing, military funerals serve an additional role in soci-
ety by improving the morale of surviving soldiers.21 Finally, Part IV
closely examines the RAFHA itself and shows that the RAFHA should be
upheld as constitutional because it meets all relevant requirements for
15. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2); see also infra Part IV.B.
16. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112, 120 (1972) (interest in maintaining
normal school activities); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (plurality opinion) (interest in
maintaining order and morality); infra Part IV.
17. See, e.g., Westboro Baptist Church, Upcoming Picket Schedule, http://www.godhatesfags.com
/schedule.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (on file with CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW) (planning protests
at the World Pride and Power Conference and a Marilyn Manson concert in February 2008); see infra
note 226 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983).
19. See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57 (examining the social and historical contexts of a cross
burning statute).
20. See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167-69 (2004) (examin-
ing the historical and social contexts of burial rites).
21. See MICHAEL SLEDGE, SOLDIER DEAD: How WE RECOVER, IDENTIFY, BURY, AND HONOR
OUR MILITARY FALLEN 17 (2005); infra text accompanying note 168.
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speech regulation, as established by the Supreme Court.22
BACKGROUND
The Westboro Baptist Church (Church), founded by Reverend Fred
Phelps and comprised almost entirely of his family members, protests at
funerals of soldiers. 23 The full message the Church delivers can be found at
its website, but essentially it propounds that a variety of tragedies befalling
the United States-including the September 11, 2001, attacks; the killing of
soldiers in Iraq and other military incursions; Hurricane Katrina that deci-
mated New Orleans in 2005; and even the 2007 Minneapolis bridge col-
lapse-are retribution from a vengeful God for the United States' tolerance
of homosexuality. 24
During the protests, members carry signs that read, for example, "God
hates fag enablers," "God hates America," and "God hates you."'25 They
shout these phrases and similar ones, such as "thank God for dead sol-
diers," to the mourners during funerals. 26 The protesters sing "'God Hates
America' to the tune of 'God Bless America.' 27 And, they stand or stomp
on the American flag.28 After witnessing the protest by the Westboro Bap-
tist Church during Sergeant Youmans' funeral, U.S. Representative Mike
Rogers, from Michigan, stated that "the vile hatred, the taunting, the jeer-
22. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (stating that a state may enforce content-neutral regulations which
are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, [leaving] open ample alternative
channels of communication."); cf Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (content-specific regulation requires "the most
exacting scrutiny"); see also supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
23. Rebecca Bland, Note, The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act: Conflicting Interests
Raise Hell with the First Amendment, 75 UMKC L. REv. 523, 525 (2006); Kathryn Westcott, Hate
Group Targeted by Lawmakers, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ ameri-
cas/5015552.stm (detailing activities of the Church).
24. Eric Black, Fred Phelps Is Coming, MINN. MONITOR, Aug. 7, 2007,
http://www.minnesotamonitor.com/showDiary.do?diaryld=2184; Press Release, Westboro Baptist
Church, God Hates America, and God Is Killing Our Troops in His Wrath (Jan. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.godhatesfags.com/written/fliers/20090102-charles-gaffney-memorial.pdf, Press Release,
Westboro Baptist Church, Thank God for Katrina (Aug. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.westborobaptistchurch.com/written/fliers/archive/20050831 thank-god-for-katrina.pdf. See
generally Westboro Baptist Church Home Page, www.godhatesfags.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
25. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (D. Md. 2008); Jury Awards Father Nearly
$11 Million in Funeral Protesters Case, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,307058,00.html [hereinafter Jury Award]; see generally Westboro Baptist Church, Photos,
http://www.godhatesfags.com/visual/photos/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (photo gallery).
26. See Complaint at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008), 2006 WL 2304608,
available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/pi/snyderwbc22307acmp.pdf (last
visited Mar. 26, 2009).
27. Jury Award, supra note 25.




ing, of these families goes beyond the pale of any sense of decency I have
ever seen."
'29
The group gained national attention by protesting at the funeral of
Matthew Shepard, who was beaten to death because he was gay. 30 Since
then, the group has continued protesting at various events and locations to
spread its message, 31 including military funerals 32 and Walter Reed Army
Medical Center.33 Press and public reaction to the group has been highly
critical. 34 For example, an angry mob of about one-thousand people at-
tacked the demonstrators during a funeral in Seaford, Delaware, after over-
powering police who were protecting the group. 35 In October 2007, a jury
awarded a soldier's father nearly eleven million dollars after he sued Phelps
family members, who protested at his son's funeral, for invasion of privacy
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 36
Legislatures around the country have passed laws prohibiting protests
at funerals, 37 including the federal Respect for America's Fallen Heroes
Act, which President George W. Bush signed into law in May 2006.38
29. Hearing, supra note 2, at 5.
30. Westcott, supra note 23.
31. See, e.g., Phelps' Church Plans Protest at Lane Bryant Victims' Funerals,
NBCCHCAGO.COM, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/localVPhelps-Church-Plans-
Protest-At-Lane-Bryant-Victims-Funerals.html (planned protests at murder victims' funerals); Westcott,
supra note 23; Church Plans to Picket Outside Camp Lejeune, WITNTV.COM, Jan. 17, 2008,
http://www.witntv.com/home/headlines/13862522.html.
32. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 2, at 5; Indiana Soldier Buried In Shadow of Hate,
NBCCHICAGO.COM, Aug. 5, 2005, http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/ocal/Indiana-Soldier-Buried-In-
Shadow-Of-Hate.html (reporting that Indiana soldier, Specialist Adam Harding, "the best America can
offer," was laid to rest amid protest).
33. Gilbert Donovan, The Patriot Guard vs. Westboro Baptist Church: A Contrasting Religious
Twist, ASSOCIATED CONTENT, May 16, 2007, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/246935/
thepatriot_.guard_vswestboro-baptist.html.
34. See, e.g., Carrie K. Hutchens, Ministries of Hate: What God Do They Serve?, DAKOTA VOICE,
Nov. 5, 2007, http://69.89.18.38/-dakotavo/20071 1/R/20071105_CH.html; Blogs of War, Video:
Crowd Chases off Westboro Baptist Church Followers, http://www.blogsofwar.com/2006/l2/01/video-
crowd-chases-off-westboro-baptist-church-followers/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) ("They are pretty
much running for their lives and trying to drive away as fast as possible. This crowd would have torn
them limb from limb.").
35. Clash over Protesters at Military Funerals, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/23/us/23brfs-brief-006.html.
36. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569 (D. Md. 2008) (reducing jury award); see also
Jury Award, supra note 25.
37. State statutes regulating speech at funerals are outside the scope of this note. For a discussion
of such state statutes, see Dunn, supra note 11, at pts. III.B, IV (examining the Kansas statute, noting
that twelve other states have passed or considered similar legislation, and analyzing the Missouri stat-
ute); Westcott, supra note 23 (noting that, as of May 2006, nine states had passed similar legislation and
twenty states had similar legislation pending).
38. See Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. No. 109-228, §§ 2(a)(1), 3(a), 120 Stat.
387-88 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 2413, 18 U.S.C. § 1387 (2006)). To view a photograph of the signing
ceremony, see Congressman Mike Rogers, Representing Michigan's 8th District,
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Westboro Baptist Church members and the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) have initiated several constitutional challenges to these statutes,
claiming they violate the protections guaranteed by the First Amendment
by limiting protected speech.39 This note, however, argues that the RAFHA
is indeed a valid proscription of speech under the First Amendment, given
Supreme Court precedent such as Grayned v. City of Rockford, Virginia v.
Black, and National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish, and
given the role of funerals in society.40
I. COURT TREATMENT OF FREE SPEECH
The First Amendment prohibits abridgement of free speech. 41 How-
ever, as Part L.A reveals, First Amendment protection is not absolute, but
depends instead on context. Part I.B details the test applied when Congress
regulates speech, namely that Congress may regulate speech when the stat-
ute is "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, [leav-
ing] open ample alternative channels of communication," and if the
regulation is content neutral and merely restricts the time, place, or manner
of delivering speech.42
A. The First Amendment Is Not Absolute
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... -43 Yet, Congress and
state legislatures 44 have, throughout the history of the United States, en-
acted such laws, and the Court has, under the proper circumstances, ruled
approvingly.45
http://www.mikerogers.house.gov/Gallery.aspx?G=2 (last visited June 6, 2009).
39. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691 (W.D. Mo. 2007), rev'd, 509 F.3d 480
(8th Cir. 2007); Susan Jones, ACLU Sues Kentucky for Restricting Funeral Protests, THE NATION, May
2, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.eomfNation/Archive/200605/NAT20060502b.html; see also infra text
accompanying note 194. Compare McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 996-97 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
(holding that the Kentucky statute is not narrowly tailored because it proscribes behavior that funeral
attendees cannot see or hear), with 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (stating that the proscribed activity must
"disturb[] or tend[] to disturb" funerals or "impede[] the access to or egress from" a federal cemetery).
40. See infra Parts III-IV; see generally Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S.
157 (2004); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
42. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution restricts state legislatures from violating the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 358.
45. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112; infra text accompanying note 58.
[Vol 84:2
FRENZY-FREE FUNERALS
The Supreme Court of the United States has approved of legislatures'
authority to make prohibiting or regulating laws because the First Amend-
ment is not viewed as an absolute. 46 In a famous example, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote, "[t]he most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic."'47 Justice Holmes recognized that the limit of the exercise of one's
rights occurs at the intersection between that exercise and the harm caused
to others. 48 The avoidance of limiting one's rights is so ingrained in Ameri-
can society, and the basis of America's laws, that one may easily forget that
the purpose of the First Amendment is a restraint upon the government
from abridging citizens' rights, but it is that same avoidance of harm to
fellow citizens that allows the government to regulate rights-for example,
speech. 49
In other words, what is at stake in a constitutional challenge of the
RAFHA is not only limiting speech and privacy interests, but also whether
American society tolerates the harm caused by disruptive demonstrations
during a funeral-a time of profound sorrow.50
46. See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 3 (1981).
47. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 88 (1949) (stating that enforcement of the First Amendment "in disregard of the rights of others
would be harsh and arbitrary in itself").
48. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (D. Md.
2008)
This Court has held and continues to hold that the First Amendment does not afford absolute
protection to individuals committing acts directed at other private individuals. The Supreme
Court of the United States has specifically held that First Amendment protection of particular
types of speech must be balanced against a state's interest in protecting its residents from
wrongful injury.
Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974)); HAIMAN, supra note 46, at 4
("For example, unrestrained communication by one person may do serious damage to the reputation and
economic well-being of another. It may constitute an unacceptable invasion of the privacy of other
people.").
49. See HAIMAN, supra note 46, at 4.
The difficulty stems from the fact that, though we have a theoretical commitment-stemming
from our history, traditions, temperament, and geography-to freedom of expression as a near
absolute, reality forces us to recognize many competing rights and interests that tempt us,
sometimes with good reason, in the direction of restraints on our systems of interpersonal and
public communication.
Id.; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 358-59 ("The First Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas, which are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.") (internal
quotations omitted).
50. See HAIMAN, supra note 46, at 4; supra text accompanying note 49; see also infra notes 137-
44 and accompanying text.
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B. Requirements of Valid Speech Regulation
In evaluating governmental infringement of free speech, the Supreme
Court applies a two-step test.51 The government must show a sufficient
state justification for the regulation of speech, and upon finding such a
valid state interest, the Supreme Court essentially balances competing in-
terests-the justification for the speech proscription (that is, the alleged
harm) against the actual manner and circumstances of the proscription.52
The Court bases its scrutiny level on two variables: first, whether the pro-
hibition is based on the content of the speech, and second, the time, place,
and manner of the prohibition. 53
When the scrutiny level is highest, the Court refers to the interest as a
"compelling state interest," and when the scrutiny level is lower the Court
uses the term "significant government interest" 54 or legitimate state inter-
est.55 For example, bans on content-specific speech in public forums, such
as parks and streets, raise the scrutiny level to its most stringent, and re-
quire the government to "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." 56
Content-neutral regulations of the time, place, and manner of expres-
sion, however, are permissible when "narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest, [leaving] open ample alternative channels of
communication. '57 For example, in Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Su-
preme Court upheld a noise ordinance preventing the imminent or actual
interference with "normal school activity. '58 The ordinance abridged
speech and even picketing near a school, if that speech or demonstration
grew so loud that it interfered with normal school operation. 59 The Court
51. See cases cited infra notes 57 and 77 and accompanying text.
52. See JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 21-
23 (4th ed. 2008); see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (noting that, "as cases
arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the
substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.")
(emphasis added).
53. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). For a discus-
sion explaining time, place, and manner restrictions, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
119-21 (1972) (discussing how the same speech delivered at one time, place, or manner may be pro-
scribed in some contexts, but not in others).
54. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
55. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980).
56. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
57. Id.
58. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112.
59. Id. at 120.
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held the ordinance did not "unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment
rights" and served an "interest in having an undisrupted school session."' 60
The ordinance was a content-neutral restriction regulating the time, place,
and manner of the delivery of speech 61 because it prohibited speech only
during class sessions, regardless of its content.62
In addition, the protestors in Grayned had other sufficient communica-
tive outlets because they could protest around the school at other times, just
not during classes. 63 Similarly, in Kovacs v. Cooper, the Supreme Court
upheld an ordinance that banned any vehicle from the public streets that
emitted loud noises when those vehicles were equipped with loud speak-
ers. 64 The Court noted that reasonable protection from such vehicles out-
weighed free speech protections. 65 In reaching its decision, the Court
articulated the underpinnings of the First Amendment by stating that the
ordinance posed "no restriction upon the communication of ideas or discus-
sion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers, [or] by pam-
phlets .... ,,66 The Court also noted, however, that the "right of free speech
is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners
and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention." 67
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Associa-
tion, the Court articulated the opportunity to reach listeners as "leav[ing]
open ample alternative channels of communication. ' 68 As part of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the local board of education in Perry allowed
only one teachers' union access to the school system's "interschool mail
system and teacher mailboxes. '69 A rival teacher's group challenged the
constitutionality of the exclusive access agreement. 70 The Court decided
ample alternatives existed because the agreement prevented only use of the
mailboxes and the mail system.71 The rival group remained free to use
"other school facilities to communicate with teachers," including school
bulletin boards, meeting rooms, and even the school's public address sys-
60. Id. at 119.
61. See id. at 116.
62. Id. at 120-21.
63. Id. at 120.
64. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78, 89 (1949).
65. Id. at 89.
66. Id
67. Id. at 87.
68. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
69. Id. at 38-39.
70. Id. at 39.
71. Id. at 41.
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tern. 72 Further, the group could "communicate with teachers by word of
mouth, telephone, or the United States mail. '73
In contrast to these content-neutral proscriptions, the Court in Boos v.
Barry invalidated a statute prohibiting certain picketing within five hundred
feet of foreign embassies in Washington, D.C., as well as other specified
locations. 74 In particular, the statute allowed display of favorable signs, but
prohibited other types of signs, "such as signs critical of a foreign govern-
ment or its policies." 75 In analyzing the statute, the Court reiterated the
principle that "content-based restriction[s] on political speech in a public
forum... must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. '76 Such scrutiny
requires the prohibition to be necessary and narrowly tailored "to serve a
compelling state interest."' 77 Although the government asserted a compel-
ling interest in protecting the dignity of foreign officials, the Court decided
that this interest was insufficient to support a content-based prohibition
because other, more narrowly tailored means existed to achieve the gov-
emment's interest.78 Additionally, the Court noted that the "justification
focuse[d] only on the content of the speech" and its impact on listeners. 79
Even content-based speech may be regulated, if the governmental
interest is important enough and the means are narrowly tailored. 80 In Vir-
ginia v. Black, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that
prohibited cross burning in public view with intent to intimidate, and also
provided that the act of cross burning itself established prima facie evi-
dence of an intent to intimidate. 81 The Court began its analysis of the stat-
ute by restating the established principle that content-specific restrictions
on speech are permitted under the First Amendment where the benefits of
speech with low social value toward the truth are "clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality."82
Preventing intimidation suffices as a social interest in maintaining
order and morality that justifies a proscription of speech and conduct.83
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316-18 (1988).
75. Id. at 316.
76. Id. at 321.
77. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
78. Id. at 321,329.
79. Id. at 321.
80. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003).
81. See id. at 348.
82. Id. at 358-59 (internal quotations omitted).
83. See id. at 360. This note does not address another ground for holding the RAFHA a valid
proscription under the First Amendment, namely that the Church's message, delivered at a funeral,
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After discussing the history of cross burning in this and other countries, the
Court concluded that cross burning is often a symbol of hate and intimida-
tion.84 The Court noted that "burning a cross is a particularly virulent form
of intimidation" that justifies the proscription.85
In allowing Virginia to regulate cross burning, which carries the mes-
sage of intimidation, the Court concluded that, because the reason for the
intimidation was irrelevant under the statute, the statute was sufficiently
content-neutral. 86 Specifically, the statute prohibited cross burning regard-
less of whether the defendant was motivated by race, gender, sexual orien-
tation, or religion. 87 Although the Court allowed the regulation of cross
burning under the First Amendment, it invalidated the portion of the statute
that established prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate because it is
possible that one could engage in cross burning for purposes other than
intimidation. 88
By contrast, in Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute
imposing a blanket prohibition on the carrying of material characterized as
"indecent," "obscene," or "patently offensive," over the Internet.89 The
Court concluded that the statute's regulation of speech was content-based
and was impermissibly overbroad and vague to withstand First Amendment
scrutiny.90 The Court acknowledged a "compelling interest in protecting
the physical and psychological well-being" of children from exposure to
indecent materials. 91 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that a blanket regu-
lation on "indecent" and "patently offensive" material via the Internet was
overbroad because it prohibited too much constitutionally protected speech
that could be stated and heard by adults, where other, less restrictive means
existed to accomplish the valid state interest.92 Moreover, the statute could
not be said to be a mere "time, place, and manner" restriction on the deliv-
constitute "fighting words." See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (unanimous
opinion) ("The test [for fighting words] is what men of common intelligence would understand would
be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight."). The test for fighting words is satisfied in
RAFHA cases because fights between protestors and funeral attendees have occurred. See supra text
accompanying note 35. If considered fighting words, protesters' speech would not be the type of speech
that the First Amendment protects. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
84. Black, 538 U.S. at 357.
85. Id. at 363.
86. See id. at 362.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 367.
89. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859-60 (1997).
90. Id. at 874.
91. Id. at 869 (internal quotations omitted).
92. Id. at 874.
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ery of pornography because it was content-specific. 93
II. COURT TREATMENT OF DEATH AND FUNERALS
Aside from cases involving the Westboro Baptist Church, including a
jury finding against Fred Phelps in Snyder v. Phelps,94 few courts have
dealt directly with freedom from undue interference during a funeral.95
Although not in a First Amendment context, courts have recognized not
only a public sentiment favoring proper burials, but also a right to privacy
that in some circumstances prevents undue intrusion into survivors' grief in
order to protect their emotional well-being.96 This Part details relevant
cases concerning death and funerary customs.
As recently as 2004, in National Archives and Records Administration
v. Favish, the Supreme Court acknowledged the deep roots of burial rites in
humankind's history.97 In National Archives, an investigator sought release
of photographs from the scene of a suicide under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act because he believed the government's investigation into the death
was flawed.98 In reaching the decision not to compel the pictures' release,
the Court recognized that the decedent's family had a personal privacy
interest in the photographs "for their own peace of mind and tranquility."99
This privacy interest outweighed the public's interest in reviewing the pho-
tographs to assess the validity of the government's investigation.100
The Court noted that funerals "are a sign of the respect a society
shows for the deceased and for the surviving family members." 101 The
Court added that "[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and
mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that,
by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect
they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their own." 102
Finally, the Court acknowledged that the common law has long recognized
the "well-established cultural tradition acknowledging a family's control
93. See id. at 879-80.
94. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569 (D. Md. 2008) (reducing jury award); see also
Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007).
95. See Bland, supra note 23, at 533.
96. See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).
97. Id. at 167-68.
98. Id. at 161-62.
99. Id. at 166.
100. Id. at 171-75.
101. Id. at 167-68.
102. Id. at 168.
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over the body and death images of the deceased."' 103
In reaching its decision in National Archives, the Court cited Schuyler
v. Curtis favorably. 104 In Schuyler, the Court of Appeals of New York rec-
ognized a right of privacy that prevents another from "improperly interfer-
ing with the character or memory of a deceased relative." 105 Schuyler
involved the use of a decedent's likeness to construct a statue honoring the
decedent. 106 The consent of the decedent's family was not obtained first,
however. 107 The Court held that no impermissible interference with the
character or memory of the deceased arose in the particular facts presented
because the statue was to be used as a tribute; thus, no mental distress ex-
isted. 108 Nevertheless, the Court noted that the living retain a right of pri-
vacy to protect their reasonable feelings. 109
Other states have recognized similar rights of privacy. 10 For example,
in another case cited approvingly by the National Archives Court, I"' the
Supreme Court of Washington in Reid v. Pierce County consolidated cases
involving the display of autopsy photographs at various places, including
cocktail parties, by members of a medical examiner's office. 12 In deciding
that the plaintiffs could proceed to trial under an invasion of privacy theory,
the Court held that the "immediate relatives of a decedent have a protect-
able privacy interest in the autopsy records of the decedent."' 13 The Court
further noted that the "protectable privacy interest is grounded in maintain-
ing the dignity of the deceased."' "14
Similarly, in 1939, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine determined in
State v. Bradbury, that the defendant may have committed an offense when
he indecently disposed of his sister's dead body by burning it in his base-
ment furnace.' 15 The Court acknowledged not only that an improper burial
would emotionally torture the living, but also that it would outrage "the
feelings and natural sentiments of the public." ' 1 6 The Court also recited the
103. Id.
104. Id. at 168-69 (citing Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895)).
105. Schuyler, 42 N.E. at 25.
106. Id. at 24.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 26.
109. Id.
110. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 169 (2004) (collecting cases).
111. Id. at 168-69.
112. Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 335 (Wash. 1998).
113. Id. at 342.
114. Id.
115. State v. Bradbury, 9 A.2d 657, 657-59 (Me. 1939).
116. Id. at 659.
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commonplace societal belief that burial places are sacred sites to which
reverential respect is owed. 117 Additionally, the Court recognized that the
survivors' interests and feelings create a duty to provide a proper and de-
cent burial.1 18
III. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF FUNERALS
Private and public funerals have a long history of facilitating healing,
and they require positive public involvement to achieve their healing func-
tion. 119 Some commentators analyze the right to grieve without interference
from noisy demonstrations by analogizing funerals to abortion protests or
to a right to be let alone. 120 These analogies further strengthen the notion
that the Supreme Court is willing not only to recognize significant state
interests in preventing interference with normal event operations, but also
to take account of societal norms and history.121
This Part examines the history and societal norms surrounding funer-
als, from both a psychological and sociological perspective. Part III.A de-
tails funeral development, emotions coincident to death and funerals, and
society's role in funerals. Part III.B describes the role that state and military
funerals play in society.
A. Only Disruption-Free Funerals Assist the Mourner
After the death of a friend or loved one, the first step along the road of
healing is the funeral. 122 A funeral service provides a social support system
that creates a caring and supportive environment-a "safe haven"-for the
bereaved to express feelings. 123 This "safe haven" enables healing and
integration of "the bereaved back into the community."' 124 In this way, the
117. Id. at 658 (internal quotations omitted).
118. See id.
119. See infra notes 145-64 and 172 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Anna Zwierz Messar, Student Piece, Balancing Freedom of Speech with the Right to
Privacy: How to Legally Cope with the Funeral Protest Problem, 28 PACE L. REV. 101, 121 (2007)
("Experts say that if laws banning funeral protests are further challenged, courts will likely look to
rulings on laws governing abortion protests."); Lauren M. Miller, Comment, A Funeral for Free
Speech? Examining the Constitutionality of Funeral Picketing Acts, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 1097, 1126-27
(2007) (discussing the right to be let alone).
121. See, e.g., supra notes 47-49, 58, 82-83, 102 and accompanying text.
122. See generally National Funeral Directors Association, Why a Funeral?, http://www2.nfda.org/
page.php?pID=159&PHPSESSID=be450031395436441951629d8eff3698 (last visited Mar. 31, 2009);
see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
123. See National Funeral Directors Association, supra note 122; infra note 145 and accompanying
text.
124. See National Funeral Directors Association, supra note 122; infra note 159 and accompanying
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public plays a critical role in a mourner's healing. 125 Although American
funerals have changed over time, 126 they remain important not only to the
bereaved, but also to our culture-both symbolically and emotionally. 127
They represent society's culture and values. 128
Burial of humans began between 100,000 and 40,000 years ago, per-
haps to protect the body. 129 More importantly, however, cemeteries--even
those not located on church grounds-have long been considered sacred. 130
In her book, The Corpse: A History, Christine Quigley notes that even
"hunter-gatherers returned to the [burial] site to honor" their dead. 131 An-
thropological theories suggest that rituals surrounding death "developed
almost compulsively from random behavior because of the necessity to
control the fearful forces surrounding death."'132 Today, control is recog-
nized as a healing aspect of the funeral. 133 Control takes many forms, in-
cluding embalming and making the deceased seem asleep. 134 The funeral
ritual "itself is a form of controlling death."' 135 In the 1980s, roughly "75
percent of funerals in the United States included ... [a] graveside ser-
vice," 136 revealing cemetery interment's critical role in healing and control.
Fear surrounding death, though, is but one emotion a mourner may
feel in "the uncontrollable potency of deep emotion" accompanying a
death, according to Paul E. Irion in his comprehensive funeral study, The
Funeral: Vestige or Value? 137 Others include abandonment, resentment,
helplessness, disillusionment, and even "hostility toward the deceased,
recalling the strained circumstances of relationship in the past."' 138 A be-
reaved feels "profound emotions"1 39 in an "intensely personal" way. 140
Hence, Irion notes that a mourner may feel "terribly alone in his sor-
text.
125. See infra notes 145-64and accompanying text.
126. See PAUL E. IRION, THE FUNERAL: VESTIGE OR VALUE? 98-99 (1966).
127. CHRISTINE QUIGLEY, THE CORPSE: A HISTORY 73 (1996); see Nat'l Archives & Records
Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167-68 (2004).
128. IRION,supra note 126, at 20; see Nat'l Archives, 541 U.S. at 167-68.
129. QUIGLEY, supra note 127, at 84; see Nat'lArchives, 541 U.S. at 167-68.
130. QUIGLEY, supra note 127, at 88; see State v. Bradbury, 9 A.2d 657, 658 (Me. 1939).
131. QUIGLEY, supra note 127, at 88.
132. IRION, supra note 126, at 91.
133. See id. at 5 1; see also Nat'lArchives, 541 U.S. at 168.
134. IRION, supra note 126, at 51-52.
135. Id. at 54.
136. QUIGLEY, supra note 127, at 72.
137. IRION, supra note 126, at 46.
138. Id. at 101-02.
139. Id. at 45.





To deal with these emotions, the funeral serves a coping function 42
and may form a lasting memory surrounding the death of a loved one. 143
"The funeral," according to Irion, "is helpful psychologically insofar as it
enables mourners to confront realistically the crisis in which they exist." 144
It provides an environment in which the mourner may freely express his
feelings. 145 Further, it allows an opportunity for the survivor to "restruc-
ture[] his relationship with the deceased."' 146
Funeral services, however, represent only the beginning of the thera-
peutic healing process because mourners must fully deal with their painful
feelings to resolve the loss. 147 Over time, our society has shortened the
mourning period from as long as a year to a matter of days. 148 People re-
sume work and normal routines almost immediately after a funeral. 149 Be-
cause the funeral plays such an integral role in the healing process, "the
brief period allotted [must] be utilized with maximum effectiveness."' 50
Irion identifies various social and psychological norms critical to a
funeral successfully serving its healing function. 151 Funerary customs pro-
vide an outlet for needed public expression of feelings. 152 The public nature
of a funeral renders it an extremely important part of the healing process. 153
The funeral provides a stable pattern of behavior from which the bereaved
receives guidance and support. 154
Moreover, the public and community play an integral role in assisting
the mourner's healing. Irion notes that they represent society's attempt to
provide "symbols which can express the feelings of the mourners."' 155 The
funeral is the mechanism by which the community conveys its support to
the mourner by expressing a shared loss or "social understanding of the
141. Id.
142. Id. at 101.
143. See, e.g., QUIGLEY, supra note 127, at 82 ("Children were once selected as pall-bearers so that
the event would leave them with an everlasting impression of human mortality.").
144. IRION, supra note 126, at 101.
145. Id. at 104.
146. Id. at97.
147. See id. at 99-102.
148. Id. at98-99.
149. Id. at 98.
150. Id. at 98-99.
151. Id. at 115-18.
152. Id. at 95; see also Hearing, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot).
153. IRION, supra note 126, at 104.
154. Id. at 91; see also Hearing, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot).
155. IRION, supra note 126, at 95.
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relationship of the living to those who have died." 156 A funeral is "the re-
sponse of the community... to the emotional experiences of the
mourner," 157 and, according to Irion, it represents "public acceptance of the
right of the mourner to express his authentic conscious feelings." 158
Further, funerals strengthen relationships between the bereaved and
the living. 159 A survivor draws strength and support from group participa-
tion, which indicates group solidarity. 160 Importantly, Irion cautions that
the environment surrounding the relational rebirth should not violate "the
integrity of [the] previous relationship with the deceased." 161
Hence, the long history of burials and funeral rites reveal that funerals
serve as a "safe haven" that promotes healing during a highly personal and
intensely painful time. Effective healing requires not only the bereaved to
maintain as much control over the funeral as possible, but also positive
public involvement. Society's sympathetic expressions to the bereaved
enable mourners to vent feelings, which is critical to the healing process by
allowing a mourner to move forward with life and beyond the loss.
B. State and Military Funerals Demonstrate Honor, Respect, and Duty
When a political leader or soldier dies, allowing mourners to move
beyond the loss requires expression of important symbols. This Part ex-
plores those symbols and their purpose.
Firing cannons and guns, flying flags at half staff, and gathering large
crowds of mourners are important symbols and critical portions of carefully
planned state funerals. In its quest to move survivors beyond a loss, such a
funeral provides a nation--or even the world-an opportunity to honor a
military or political leader. 162 For example, via television or in person,
millions of people watched President John F. Kennedy's funeral, which
included a twenty-one gun salute and a fifty jet airplane fly-over. 163
President Kennedy is not alone in receiving grand honors upon his
death. 164 A profoundly silent, yet enormous crowd watched the procession
156. Id. at 117; see also Hearing, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot).
157. IRION, supra note 126, at 104; see also Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S.
157, 167-68 (2004); Hearing, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot).
158. IRION, supra note 126, at 104.
159. Id. at 117.
160. Id. at 99.
161. Id. at 118; see also Nat'l Archives, 541 U.S. at 168.
162. QUIGLEY, supra note 127, at 73.
163. Id. at 76.
164. Id. at 73-77 (collecting examples).
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carrying the slain President Abraham Lincoln to the Capitol building. 165 A
long train journey through the country then followed, comprising the coun-
try's "first great state funeral."' 166 The President's casket was opened at
station stops, enabling an estimated one million people to view the Presi-
dent's body amid draped buildings. 167
Soldiers, no less than civil and military leaders, have long held a spe-
cial status in American funerals, 168 dating back at least to the Civil War and
the massive collection of soldiers' bodies from battlefields to provide for
placement in permanent military cemeteries. 169 Proper soldier burial coin-
cides with our national belief system and gives meaning to the soldier's
sacrifice.' 7 0 Michael Sledge, in his book Soldier Dead: How We Recover,
Identify, Bury, and Honor Our Military Fallen, instructs that their sacrifice
imposes a general duty to "give them a secure resting place .... [to] pre-
serve their place in history and assure our future."' 171 Moreover, a proper
burial with customary rites improves the morale of surviving soldiers and
prevents haunting images from mentally tormenting surviving soldiers and
family. 172
IV. THE RESPECT FOR AMERICA'S FALLEN HEROES ACT IS
CONSTITUTIONAL
As described above in Part I, the government must show a justifica-
tion, or significant interest, for a speech proscription. 173 Once it demon-
strates a valid interest, the scrutiny level depends upon whether the statute
prohibits speech in a content-specific or content-neutral manner. 174 The
level of scrutiny, in turn, determines the required narrowness of the statute
along with whether other available communication avenues must exist. 175
165. Id. at75.
166. MUSEUM OF FUNERAL CUSTOMS, THE EMBALMING OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN (n.d.), available
at http://www.funeralmuseum.org/pdf/embalmlincoln.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (on file with
Chicago-Kent Law Review).
167. See id.
168. See generally SLEDGE, supra note 21.
169. See id. at 298.
170. Id. at 297; see also Hearing, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot).
171. SLEDGE, supra note 21, at 297.
172. See id. at 17; see also, e.g., Hearing, supra note 2, at 6 (email to Rep. Mike Rogers from
Sergeant Ashley A. Voss, Baghdad, Iraq ("The thought of their families having to face protesters after
their memorials insights a rage I have never known before. These 'protesters' mock all that we have
accomplished here.")).
173. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see supra Part
I.B.
174. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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The RAFHA proscribes disruptive demonstrations near federal ceme-
teries during a limited time period of one hour before through one hour
after a funeral. 176 The RAFHA does not discriminate among demonstration
types; it bans all disruptive demonstrations, regardless of their content. 177
The RAFHA protects citizens from additional emotional harm and allows a
funeral to serve its healing function. 178 Further, because the content of the
demonstrations is not regulated, the RAFHA leaves open ample alternative
outlets for expression of ideas. 179
A. The RAFHA
U.S. Representative Steve Chabot, from Ohio, expressed the motiva-
tion of the bill's supporters during committee hearings when he said, "the
families and friends of our nation's fallen heroes [should] be given a few
hours of peace within which to honor their loved ones' ultimate sacri-
fice."' 80 He continued, "[t]hat is the least we can do for those who have
fought and given their life to uphold the Constitution."' 181
U.S. Representative Mike Rogers, of Michigan, embraced the notion
that funerals represent society's sympathetic expressions to mourners' in-
tense pain, when he characterized the RAFHA as "America's chance to put
our arms around these families and tell them we love them, we appreciate
it, we certainly appreciate their sacrifice. And we will allow you the dignity
and peace to lay to rest your loved one .... ",182
Furthering these motivations, Congress passed the RAFHA, 183 which
176. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006).
177. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(b).
178. See infra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
179. See infra Part IV.D.
180. Hearing, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot).
181. Id. The full text of this portion of Representative Chabot's testimony states:
In conclusion, let me say that all supporters of H.R. 5037 are asking is that the families
and friends of our nation's fallen heroes be given a few hours of peace within which to honor
their loved ones' ultimate sacrifice. A few hours to pay respect to a selfless life devoted to
protecting others. That is not unconstitutional. That is not even an imposition. That is the least
we can do for those who have fought and given their life to uphold the Constitution.
I urge all my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill, which will give the families of
those who have died the comfort of knowing that they will be able to pray in peace and thank
the fallen on and near the sacred ground where they will rest forever so that we can live free
today.
Id.
182. Id. at 4-5 (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers).
183. The prohibition sections of the RAFHA state:
(a) Prohibition.-No person may carry out-
(1) a demonstration on the property of a cemetery under the control of the National
Cemetery Administration or on the property of Arlington National Cemetery unless the
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proscribes demonstrations "on the property of a cemetery under the control
of the National Cemetery Administration or on the property of Arlington
National Cemetery unless the demonstration has been approved" by the
cemetery's director or superintendent. 184 The RAFHA prohibits demonstra-
tions near a cemetery from one hour before until one hour after a funeral or
memorial service. 185 Specifically, a demonstration may not occur within
300 feet of a cemetery if it "impedes the access to or egress from such
cemetery."' 186 Further, a demonstration may not "take[] place within 150
feet of a road, pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress from such
cemetery property."1 87
A demonstration is defined as including the willful "making of any
noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order
of the funeral," such as picketing, an oration "that is not part of a funeral,"
displaying signs and placards "unless such a display is part of a funeral," or
distributing any "written or printed matter other than a program distributed
as part of a funeral."' 188
demonstration has been approved by the cemetery superintendent or the director of the
property on which the cemetery is located; or
(2) with respect to such a cemetery, a demonstration during the period beginning 60
minutes before and ending 60 minutes after a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony is
held, any part of which demonstration-
(A)(i) takes place within 150 feet of a road, pathway, or other route of ingress to or
egress from such cemetery property; and
(ii) includes, as part of such demonstration, any individual willfully making or as-
sisting in the making of any noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the
peace or good order of the funeral, memorial service, or ceremony; or
(B) is within 300 feet of such cemetery and impedes the access to or egress from
such cemetery.
(b) Demonstration.-For purposes of this section, the term "demonstration" includes the fol-
lowing:
(1) Any picketing or similar conduct.
(2) Any oration, speech, use of sound amplification equipment or device, or similar con-
duct that is not part of a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony.
(3) The display of any placard, banner, flag, or similar device, unless such a display is
part of a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony.
(4) The distribution of any handbill, pamphlet, leaflet, or other written or printed matter
other than a program distributed as part of a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony.
38 U.S.C. § 2413.
184. Id. § 2413(a)(1). Prior restraint issues are outside the scope of this note because it is unlikely
that the RAFHA presents any such issues. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 543 (1985) ("Prior
restraints which control protected speech must ordinarily be neutral with respect to its content, but may
limit speech with respect to its time, place, or manner.") (footnotes omitted). But see Cornwell, supra
note 11, at 1371-74 (arguing that in passing the RAFHA, Congress relied on Griffin v. Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002), but that Griffin was erroneously decided, rendering
the RAFHA an unconstitutional prior restraint).
185. 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2).
186. Id. § 2413(a)(2)(B).
187. Id. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(i).
188. Id. §§ 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii), (b).
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B. The RAFHA Is Narrowly Tailored
Some argue that the RAFHA is a content-based prohibition on
speech. 189 Such arguments contend that the statute draws a distinction be-
tween two categories of speech: speech that is part of a funeral service and
speech that is not part of a funeral service. 190 Attempting to categorize the
statute as content-specific based on that distinction overlooks not only the
purpose of the statute, but also the Supreme Court's willingness to take into
account the circumstances of the regulation. 191 In Grayned, the statute did
not prohibit all speech near a school during school hours; it prohibited only
the speech that interfered with normal school activities. 192 The RAFHA
repeatedly and specifically differentiates between acts and materials that
are part of a funeral, and acts and materials that are not part of a funeral. 193
The distinction here is similar to the statute in Grayned because the pro-
scribed speech is only the speech that interferes with normal funeral activi-
ties, such as speech that is not part of a funeral ceremony. Indeed, the
statute specifically states that the proscribed behavior is only that which
"disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of the funeral."' 194
Like Grayned, the statute here is merely a "time, place, and manner"
restriction. 195 In Grayned, picketers were free to demonstrate loudly at any
time except during the critical period of school hours. 196 The restriction
here likewise regulates a critical and narrow timeframe of only one hour
before through one hour after a funeral. 197 Any group wishing to protest or
demonstrate near a cemetery may indeed do so, just not during the statuto-
rily-defined narrow timeframe.198 Moreover, the statute here is simply not
as restrictive as the statute tested in Reno.199 Unlike the statute in Reno,
which completely regulated internet material at all times, the statute here
only regulates speech during a specific, narrow period of time.200
189. See, e.g., Comwell, supra note 11, at 1351-55.
190. See, e.g., id. at 1352.
191. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (analyzing federal
regulations requiring the denial of a protest permit to protect parks from harm); see also discussion
supra Part Ill and text accompanying notes 47-50, 58, 180-88.
192. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972); see also discussion supra notes
58-63.
193. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(b)(2)-(4).
194. Id. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
195. See infra text accompanying notes 196-201.
196. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 120.
197. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2).
198. See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.D.
199. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
200. Compare discussion supra notes 89-93 (prohibition at all times) with 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)
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Further, an argument suggesting that the RAFHA is content-specific
overlooks the distinction made in Boos.201 The concern in Boos stemmed
from the fact that the statute allowed some specific content, but prohibited
other specific content, namely a message critical of foreign officials or
countries.202 Here, the statutory provisions do not proscribe speech based
on the content of the message, but instead seek to cure the disruptive effect
of all demonstrations that interfere with funeral services. 203
C. The RAFHA Serves a Significant Governmental Interest
Not only would loud demonstrations interfere with a funeral's "safe
haven," relationship restructuring, and free expression of "profound emo-
tions," but they would also decrease the effectiveness of the funeral-the
brief period that Irion notes as essential to healing. 204 As Irion pointed out,
positive public involvement facilitates healing.205 It provides symbols ex-
pressing the mourner's feelings and serves as a source of strength and sup-
port for the mourner.206 In sharp contrast to the profoundly silent crowd
observing President Lincoln's funeral, the Westboro Baptist Church shouts
phrases such as "Thank God for dead soldiers!" at military funerals. 207
Such demonstrations would undermine the purposes that Irion noted.
In National Archives, the Court acknowledged the importance of con-
trol surrounding death.208 A frenzy-free funeral simply extends the area of
control to the funeral, which itself is a form of control. 209 The Court also
recognized the significance of family members' "peace of mind and tran-
quility" when recognizing a personal privacy interest in death-scene photo-
graphs. 210 The Court acknowledged the dual role of funerals as "a sign of
the respect a society shows for the deceased and for the surviving family
members."'211 The RAFHA allows society to show its respect by eliminat-
ing disruptions that interfere with mourners' peace of mind and healing,
and by preventing undue intrusion into mourners' grief to protect their
(prohibition only one hour before through one hour after a funeral).
201. See discussion supra notes 74-79.
202. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988).
203. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2); see also discussion supra notes 180-82.
204. See IRION, supra note 126, at 99-102; see also discussion supra Part M.A.
205. See discussion supra notes 151-61.
206. See discussion supra notes 154-61.
207. See discussion supra notes 25-29, 165-69.
208. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004).
209. See discussion supra notes 132-139.
210. Nat'lArchives, 541 U.S. at 166.
211. Id. at 168.
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emotional well-being.212 Additionally, it preserves the reverential respect
of burial places that the Bradbury court noted has long existed.213
Moreover, as author Michael Sledge reveals, a proper burial improves
morale of surviving soldiers.214 The legislative history of the RAFHA
demonstrates that soldiers' morale was within Congress' contemplation.215
Because the RAFHA is a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction, the most exacting strict scrutiny will not apply to the
RAFHA.216 Even if the Court imposed strict scrutiny, though, the RAFHA
would survive such scrutiny. The government has a compelling interest in
protecting the mental health of grieving families and protecting not only the
sanctity of funerals, but also the morale of soldiers serving in the mili-
tary.217
In addition, the Court in Black allowed a content-based proscription of
cross burning because it prevented intimidation.218 Maintaining order and
morality were sufficient government interests in Black.219 Here, the
RAFHA serves a similar purpose. The RAFHA specifically proscribes
demonstrations that "disturb the peace or good order of [a] funeral," 220 and
reinforces society's morality surrounding proper funerals. 221
D. The RAFHA Allows Alternative Avenues of Expression
The Perry Court required "ample alternative channels of communica-
tion" for time, place, and manner restrictions. 222 Besides obvious outlets,
such as simply protesting at different places, many other outlets exist for
protest groups, such as the Westboro Baptist Church, to deliver its mes-
212. See discussion supra notes 99-105 and Part IV.A.
213. See State v. Bradbury, 9 A.2d 657, 658 (Me. 1939); see also discussion supra note 117.
214. See SLEDGE, supra note 168, at 17; see also supra notes 170-75and accompanying text.
Improving morale of soldiers by providing proper burial rites to fallen military personnel only bolsters
an already significant government interest in protecting normal funeral activities that allow mourners to
heal and maintain control, while also allowing society to preserve important symbols.
215. See Hearing, supra note 2, at 5-6 (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers, reading an email from
Sergeant Ashley A. Voss, Baghdad, Iraq); see also supra note 172.
216. See supra notes 53-57 and Part IV.B.
217. See Hearing, supra note 2, at 11 (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers) (noting a compelling gov-
ernment interest in allowing families peace and dignity during funeral); id. (statement of Rep. Silvestre
Reyes) (discussing a "compelling government interest" in protecting military families); see also supra
text accompanying notes 170-75.
218. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (plurality opinion); supra text accompanying
note 83.
219. See Black, 538 U.S. at 360; supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
220. 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
221. See discussion supra notes 101-08and Part III.
222. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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sage, including websites. 223 Further, because the RAFHA is merely a time,
place, and manner restriction of speech, anyone is free, as U.S. Representa-
tive Mike Rogers explained, "to circle the cemetery an hour before at a
[300] foot distance and spew [their] hate and discontent. '" 224
Some argue, though, that the RAFHA does not allow for adequate
alternative avenues of communication for the Westboro Baptist Church, in
particular, because the Church seeks to reach funeral attendees, who are
unlikely to "arrive an hour ahead of the service or stay an hour after-
ward. '225 This argument overlooks the fact that the Church protests at
places other than funerals, such as Walter Reed Army Medical Center, and
plans protests at various conferences, concerts, and military bases.226
CONCLUSION
Death is perhaps the most natural part of life. For centuries, humans
223. See, e.g., Westboro Baptist Church Home Page, supra note 24 (indicating that the Church is
already spreading its message via the Internet). The rationale in this Part applies equally to any group
protesting at funerals. For example, if anti-war protestors, who often protest on city streets, see, e.g.,
Anti-War Protesters March Down Michigan Ave., NBCCHICAGO.COM, Mar. 19, 2008,
http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Anti-War-Protesters-March-Down-Michigan-Ave.htm, began
disruptively protesting at federal cemeteries, the RAFHA would apply and such groups would similarly
have ample alternative outlets for idea expression, see, e.g., infra notes 224-29and accompanying text.
224. Hearing, supra note 2, at II (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers).
225. Katherine A. Ritts, Note, The Constitutionality of "Let Them Rest in Peace" Bills: Can Gov-
ernments Say "Not Today, Fred" to Demonstrations at Funeral Ceremonies?, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV.
137, 167-68 (2007). Ritts' argument ultimately relies on Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029,
1040-42 (7th Cir. 2002). Id. at 167 n.23 1. In Weinberg, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
relied on Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000). Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1041-42. The
Gresham court stated:
[A]n adequate alternative cannot totally foreclose a speaker's ability to reach one audience
even if it allows the speaker to reach other groups. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689,
698 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that total ban on sidewalk art does not leave open alternative
means of communication because alternative display in galleries or museums would not reach
the same audience.).
Gresham, 225 F.3d at 906-07; see also Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1041. Gresham reveals that "[a]n ade-
quate alternative does not have to be the speaker's first or best choice... or one that provides the same
audience or impact for the speech." Gresham, 225 F.3d at 906 (citations omitted); see also Weinberg,
310 F.3d at 1042. The court continued, "an alternative must be more than merely theoretically available.
It must be realistic as well." Gresham, 225 F.3d at 906. The RAFHA provides realistically available
outlets for communication, including audiences that the Westboro Baptist Church already reaches. See
infra note 226 and accompanying text. Additionally, a critical issue in Bery v. City of New York was that
street artists could not reach a public audience. 97 F.3d at 698. The Bery court explained that "appel-
lants are entitled to a public forum for their expressive activities." Id. The RAFHA allows for public
demonstrations at other times or places. See, e.g., infra note 226 and accompanying text.
226. Donovan, supra note 33 (discussing a protest at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center); see
also Westboro Baptist Church Upcoming Picket Schedule, http://www.godhatesfags.com/schedule.html
(last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (noting a planned protest at the World Pride and Power Conference and a




have been honoring and respecting their fallen family members and
friends. 227 Protecting the psychological well-being of mourners while they
cope with profound personal grief is a significant state interest justifying
speech regulation at funerals. 228 The content-neutral RAFHA is narrowly
tailored to achieve its goal by proscribing speech with a mere "time, place,
and manner" limitation.229 The RAFHA leaves open adequate alternative
avenues for expression of any message would-be protesters wish to deliver,
such as concerts, conferences, and other places. 230
The RAFHA serves as an expression of appreciation of soldiers' ulti-
mate sacrifice, and it protects mourners' peace and dignity.231 It symboli-
cally allows society to put its arms around widows like Mrs. Katie
Youmans and every other grieving family attending military funerals at
federal cemeteries. 232
See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Parts I-IV.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.D.
See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-6, 182 and accompanying text.
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